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Abstract
The regulation of home country to govern business and human rights has been commonly 
debated. It is argued that home states regulations have a potential role to play in the regulation 
of multinationals on business and human rights. It particularly can fill the gap due to the 
extraterritorial nature of MNC operations which requires an integrated regulatory approach 
and it can also provide alternative forum for victims to human rights violation by corporation 
to seek justice. The question is in what sense home states should be responsible for violations 
of human rights by subsidiaries in host countries. What are the justifications and what are the 
limitations? This article tries to answer those questions by highlighting the debates over the duty 
bearer, a right or obligations of home countries to impose extraterritorial regulations to other 
countries. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the problematic and major issues in the context of business 
and human rights is the regulatory framework. There are a number of 
regulations that international businesses need to respect, and these are 
both national and international in nature. First, a corporation should 
respect national legislation in which it is operating in various fields 
such as taxation, labour protection, environmental standards, etc. 
However, there are several problems facing such regulation: who 
should regulate multinationals as a whole considering its multi-national 
business operations? Is it the obligation of home or host countries? 
Some countries have attempted to propose and apply a law which 
could regulate their companies overseas.1 Even so, the extent to which 
1  European Union, Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises Operating 
in Developing Countries, Towards a European Code of Conduct, C 104/180, 14 Janu-
ary 1999; Deva, Surya, “Acting Extraterritorial to Tame Multinational Corporations 
for Human Rights Violations: Who Should ‘Bell the Cat’?,” Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 5  (2004), pp. 52 - 54. 
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such extraterritorial jurisdiction can be exercised remains unclear. 
Civil society and academics have gathered and developed Maastricht 
Principles on the Extraterritorial Obligation of States in the Area of 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights calling for all states to meet its 
extraterritorial obligations. Nevertheless, the question is whether such 
obligations have a legal foundation supported by state practices. This is 
the question which is further developed in this article. 
For the purpose of this article, there are several clarifications which 
have to be made. First, the wording ‘human rights’ refers to the human 
rights articulated in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and 
other human rights instruments. This article will only focus on the 
economic, social, and cultural rights as articulated in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Second, bearing 
in mind the varieties of definitions of Multinational Corporations or 
(MNC),2  this research will focus on MNC in which the parent companies 
or home companies are normally established in a developed state and 
their subsidiaries in developing states. This definition thus reflects both 
the corporate body as a whole and its separate entities, which might 
operate either individually or collectively, by embracing the realities 
of complex structure, control, and operation. Last, the analysis applies 
the construction of law as found in international law which is viewed 
broadly as a dynamic decision-making process involving various 
bodies of law and policies resulted from interactions between different 
participants.3 Here, it is assumed that international law is binding states 
— and to some extent, individuals — including legal entities within a 
state. 
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF HOME COUNTRY
Why is home state regulation important in the context of corporate 
human rights responsibility? The answer is more pragmatic than 
theoretical. Placing a regulatory burden exclusively on host countries 
is quite problematic and inefficient, due to the extraterritorial nature 
2  Patricia Rinwigati Waagstein, Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: Continuous 
Search for A Regulatory Framework (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2009), 22–27.
3  Waagstein, Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: Continuous Search for A Reg-
ulatory Framework, 31–37.
Justifying Extraterritorial Regulations of Home Country
363
of MNC operations which requires an integrated regulatory approach. 
Many cases reveal that subsidiaries may easily close down their 
operations and move to different countries, all the while leaving the 
home state untouched. In this case, the main concern is the victims to 
human rights violation whose access to justice may be limited. 
A second functional difficulty is that many host countries are 
also developing countries, which often face economic and political 
difficulties. The conflict of interest between economic and human rights, 
limited natural resources, or simply pressure from other institutions 
has hindered the application and protection of human rights in host 
countries. It is argued in this article that home state regulation can 
provide a partial solution to the loopholes created by such a regulatory 
vacuum. 
Third, from the victim’s perspective, the possibility of adjudication 
against a parent corporation in its home country has opened a window to 
seeking justice that may not be readily available in one’s own country. 
Thus, extending regulation to home states strengthens the relative 
position of those victims. 
III.DEFINING HOME COUNTRY
What is home country? The term ‘home country’ is always associated 
with the nationality of a corporation. Some commentators have argued 
that nationality of MNC should be irrelevant, since the former is 
inherently obscure4 and fails to reflect the complicated structure of 
MNC.5 However, in the normative sense of the segregation of state 
authority, this concept remains important. In international law, knowing 
which state a particular entity belongs to is a condition for entitlement 
of state responsibility, diplomatic protection and judicial proceedings, 
jurisdiction,6 and enemy status in time of war. Moreover, this nationality 
4  Nigh, Douglas, “Who’s on First? Nation-States, National Identity and Multinational 
Corporations,” International Business: Institutions and the Dissemination of Knowl-
edge, eds. Brian Toyne and Douglas William Nigh (South Carolina: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1999), p. 263.
5  Ibid.
6  Permanent Court of International Justice, Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and 
Marocco (French Zone) on November 8th, 1921, 1923, PCIJ, Ser. B., No. 4. 
Patricia Rinwigati Waagstein
364
is also important when determining the law to be applied, restrictions 
on MNC, and jurisdiction over companies abroad.
Unlike individual nationality, where state practices provide 
consistent criteria, determining the nationality of a corporation is far 
more complicated. Three basic considerations are commonly used 
to determine the linkage between state and corporation: place of 
incorporation,7 place of management,8 and place of control/shareholder 
location.9
A. THE PLACE OF INCORPORATION
The state of incorporation refers to the place where the corporation 
was created as a legal entity. The conferring of legal status – which 
expresses the juridical link with the country – indicates that the law of the 
country is also the abiding law of the company.10 This practice is common 
in common law countries and with some international instruments. It 
makes sense that the corporation, logically speaking, would be a ‘legal 
entity’ or ‘citizen’ only of the state whose laws created it. This is also 
easily ascertainable, as it requires no further examination of the place of 
management, internal corporate organisation, and procedure. As such, 
it offers a measure of legal certainty and predictability in choice of law 
matters for both state administrators and regulated firms.11 Nevertheless, 
there are criticisms. Today, this model does not necessarily reflect the 
7  Lowe, Vaughan, “Jurisdiction,” International Law, ed. Malcolm D. Evans, Second 
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 345 & 346; Kokkini-Iatridou, D. and 
Waart, P.J.I.M de, “Foreign Investment in Developing Countries - Legal Personality 
of Multinational Corporations in International Law,” Netherland Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law 14  (1993), pp. 96 & 97.
8  Wallace, Cynthia Day, The Multinational Enterprise and Legal Control: Host State Sover-
eignty in an Era of Economic Globalization (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2002), 
p. 134.
9  International Court of Justice, The Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company, 
Limited (Belgium V. Spain), Judgment, 1962, I.C.J. Report 19.
10  Kokkini-Iatridou, D. and Waart, P.J.I.M de, “Foreign Investment in Developing 
Countries - Legal Personality of Multinational Corporations in International Law,” 
Netherland Yearbook of International Law 14  (1993), pp. 96 & 97.
11  Rammeloo, Stephann, Corporation in Private International Law; a European Per-
spective (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 17; Mabry, Linda A., “Multina-
tional Corporations and U.S. Technology Policy: Rethinking the Concept of Corpo-
rate Nationality,” Georgetown Law Journal 87  (1998 - 1999), p. 584.
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day-to-day dynamics of a corporation. Many corporations are completely 
inactive in the particular place of incorporation, effectively making it a 
fiction construction (albeit, not necessarily unlawful).  Therefore, it is 
argued, using the place of incorporation as the sole determinant of a 
corporation’s nationality is not sufficient. As the lex societatis or place 
of management has become more important, it is increasingly argued 
that there should be other ways of defining this status.
B. THE PLACE OF MANAGEMENT OR REAL SEAT
This approach argues that the decisive factor for determining 
corporate nationality should be based on the place where the effective 
connection between corporation and the claiming state has been 
established; namely, the place of corporate management or the real seat. 
One interpretation of this defines the ‘seat’ as the location of central 
management or administration, from which control is effectively 
exercised.12  Another regards it as the site of production facilities.13 
However, in both cases there is a question of whether this would mean 
a corporation’s headquarters, or the meeting place of directors and/or 
shareholders. Here, there is no agreement. Although most European 
countries have come to regard the place of central administration as 
a decisive determinant,14 their ultimate definition is unclear. Even 
assuming that a semantic consensus is possible, it is convincingly argued 
that in the globalized business world it is often difficult to determine the 
actual location of a company’s real seat. Business undertakings cannot 
be expected to operate in solely one market over time.
C. THE PLACE OF SHAREHOLDERS & CONTROL 
The concept of shareholders/control as a criterion for determining 
the nationality of corporations is an exception to the principle of 
the corporate veil, that separates the corporation from its members 
and endows it with rights and duties of its own. This approach was 
developed with the goal of protecting national security and economic 
interests from hostile foreign armies, and was applied in the context of 
12  Wallace, Cynthia Day, The Multinational Enterprise and Legal Control: Host State 
Sovereignty in an Era of Economic Globalization (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Pub-





wartime to control enemy trade and property ownership. There are some 
practical difficulties with this conception, however.  Discerning the 
identity and nationality of individual shareholders, as well as directors 
with the power to influence key decisions, is becoming increasingly 
difficult. The growing number of corporations, and the extensive 
networks of interrelated companies whose shares are traded daily 
among stockholders around the globe or held by institutional investors, 
can make this a complicated task. 
D. MULTIPLE APPROACHES
While the tests above constitute some criteria for determining 
corporate nationality in state practice, in practice, each approach must 
be applied in combination with others. Civil law countries which 
commonly apply the real seat normally require incorporation in the 
same state, making the ultimate ‘test’ for either approach virtually 
identical.15 This is also the case with common law countries.16 In the 
case of international claims for compensation, the Iran-United States 
Tribunal requires that the claimant be a national of the United States 
(against Iran) or a national of Iran (against the United States) based 
on all tests: the place of incorporation, the place of management and 
the nationality of shareholder.17 In the context of diplomatic protection, 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case of Barcelona Traction 
establishes that international law ‘attributes the right of diplomatic 
protection of a corporate entity to the State under the laws of which it 
15  Wallace, Cynthia Day, The Multinational Enterprise and Legal Control: Host State 
Sovereignty in an Era of Economic Globalization (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Pub-
lisher, 2002), p. 134. 
16  Restatement of the Third Law: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States Re-
statement of the Law, ed. The American Law Institute, vol. 1 (St Paul, American Law 
Institute Publishers, 1986), Section 213 on Nationality of Corporation.
17  Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Alge-
ria concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran article II paragraph 1 
and article VII paragraph 1 and 2. Also see: Aldrich, George H., The Jurisprudence 
of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 44 - 
54; Malanczuk, Peter, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, Seventh 
Revised ed. (London, Rautledge, 1997), pp. 266 & 267.
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is incorporated and in whose territory has its registered office.’18 The 
basic premises of the Barcelona Traction case have been consistently 
applied by the International Law Commission (ILC), on its Draft [of] 
Diplomatic Protection (2006). While this Draft law applied those three 
tests, the state of incorporation should be applied first.19 However, 
when the corporation is controlled by nationals of other states and has 
no substantial business activities in the state of incorporation, and the 
site of management and financial control is located in another state, 
the place of management test should be applied.20 Finally, the place 
of shareholders test can only be applied in exceptional cases; namely, 
when a corporation ceases to exist or there is direct injury toward 
shareholders.21
These elaborations signify that in international law, there is no 
common regulation regarding the approaches used to determine 
corporate nationality. The factors considered depend upon the context 
of the particular rules of law involved.22 Consequently, it is difficult to 
pinpoint which state is a corporation’s home state, since this could be 
represented by the state of incorporation, state of management, or state 
of shareholders. This flexibility approach enables victims to redress 
claims against MNCs in different places.
IV. JUSTIFYING EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS
A. THE CONCEPT OF JURISDICTION UNDER HUMAN 
RIGHTS
It should be kept in mind here that the jurisdictional question on 
human rights, while overlapping, ultimately differs from the doctrine of 
jurisdiction, which allows states to prescribe regulation extraterritorially 
18  International Court of Justice, The Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company, 
Limited (Belgium V. Spain), Judgment, 1962, I.C.J. Report 19, para. 70.
19  International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Com-
mentaries, ifty-eight session sess., UN GA A/61/10, 2006, Draft Article 9.
20  Ibid.
21  Ibid., Draft Article 11.
22  Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, Fourth ed. (Oxford, Claren-
don Express, 1990), p. 422.
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based on nationality, protection, and universal principles. In the latter 
case, the doctrine describes the limits of legal competence of a state to 
regulate conduct or the consequences of events,23 and jurisdiction is its 
authority to effect legal interests over certain conduct. In the context of 
human rights, this is quite different. Here, the jurisdictional question 
refers to the web of protection of individuals by various states, in which 
one state’s protection ends where another state’s begins.24 Accordingly, 
jurisdiction is aimed to ‘delineate as appropriately as possible the 
pool of persons to which a state ought to secure human rights.’25 In 
other words, jurisdiction in human rights regimes is perceived as an 
opportunity, rather than limitation, to extend individual protection.  
When, then, do states have the obligation to regulate MNC operating 
abroad? The Maastricht Principles, although initiated by civil society, 
provide a guideline on the scope of extraterritorial regulations: 
1. Jurisdiction based on effective control over territory
It has been recognised under international law that under certain 
circumstances, a state can be found to have obligations outside its 
territory toward non-national entities in instances where it exercises 
‘effective control.’ Occupation and control of military or paramilitary 
forces are often cited as the clearest examples of states exercising 
effective control. In the 1971 ICJ case on Advisory Opinion on the 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) involving the illegal occupation 
of Namibia by South Africa, the ICJ confirms that the ‘physical control 
of a territory and not sovereignty or legitimacy of title, is the basis for 
23   The term ‘jurisdiction’ is also commonly used in international law to describe 
the scope of the rights of an international tribunal, such as the International Court of 
Justice of the International Criminal Court, to adjudicate on cases and to make orders 
in respect of the parties to them. See : Lowe, Vaughan, “Jurisdiction,” International 
Law, ed. Malcolm D. Evans, Second ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 
335 & 336.
24  Skogly, Sigrun I., Beyond National Borders: States’ Human Rights Obligations in 
International Cooperation (Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2006), p. 45.
25  Heijer, Maarteen den and Lawson, Rick, “Transnational Human Rights and the 
Concept of ‘Jurisdiction’,” ESF Exploratory Workshop on Transnational Human 
Rights Obligation in the Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Tilburg: 
2008), pp. 11 & 12.
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State liability for acts affecting other states. ‘26 The Court also stated 
that South Africa remained accountable for any violations of the rights 
of the people of Namibia.27 
In human rights regimes, several forms of jurisprudence from 
different organs apply the same principle of state’s effective control 
to establish extraterritorial human rights obligations. In the 1981 case 
of Lopex Burgos v. Uruguay, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) 
expanded the interpretation of Article 2 of the ICCPR to include  any 
‘violations of rights under the Covenant which its [state] agents commit 
upon the territory of another State, whether with the acquiescence of 
the Government of that State or in opposition to it.28 In the case of the 
West Bank and Gaza, the Human Rights Committee applied the same 
approach, concluding that Israel was responsible for all conduct of its 
authorities or agents in those territories under its control that affected 
the enjoyment of rights under the Covenant.29 
In the context of the European Court of Human Rights, the concept 
of extraterritorial obligation based on state control has been consistently 
applied in various cases. In the case of Loizidou v. Turkey, involving 
the confiscation of property in Turkish-occupied areas of Northern 
Cyprus, the European Court of Human Rights held that responsibility 
for one’s own acts can reach outside one’s territory, provided that it has 
effective control over the territory where the act occurred regardless of 
the legality of such control. 30 The same position has been confirmed in 
the more recent case of Cyprus v. Turkey. 31 In the well-known Bankovic 
26  International Court of Justice Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276 (1970), Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Or-
ders, 1971, para. 118. 
27  Ibid., paras. 109 & 112.
28  052/1979, Delia Saldias de Lopez (alleged victim’s wife) on behalf of Sergio Ruben 
Lopex Burgos v. Uruguay, 29 July 1981, para. 12.1. and 12.30. 
29  Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Resports Submitted by States Par-
ties under Article 40 of the Covenant; Concluding Observation of the Human Rights 
Committee, Israel, Seventy-eight sess., CCPR/CO/78/ISR, 21 August 2003, para. 11.
30  Clarkson, Max B.E., “A Stakeholder Framework for Analysing and Evaluating 
Corporate Social Performance,” Academy of Management Review 20.1 (1995), p. 62.
31  European Court of Human Rights, Cyprus V. Turkey, Appl. No. 25781/94, Jugd-
ment of 10 May 2001, 2001, p. 77. Emphasis added.
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case, involving victims’ complaints relating to the NATO attack in the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the European Court of Human Rights 
went further by allowing 
[...]its recognition of the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a Con-
tracting State is exceptional: it has done so when the respondent State, 
through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants 
abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, in-
vitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercise all or 
some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government.32
Despite the criticism of Bankovic per se,33 this case highlights three 
important issues. First, it confirmed that an extraterritorial obligation 
exists as a general exception. This decision opens the possibility for 
future complaints relating to peacekeeping operations where the armed 
forces of a Contracting party exercise all or some of the public power in 
a specific region.34 Apparently, the Bankovic case has been referenced 
by Saddam Hussein to seek claims for human rights violations under the 
protection of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and 
on the basis of effective de facto control over Iraq by European countries. 
The Court concluded that due to the lack of clarity on the division of 
responsibility and power among the United States of America (USA) 
and European countries involved in peacekeeping operations there, 
it was not clear whether there was a jurisdictional link for European 
32  European Court of Human Rights, Bankovic A.O. V. Belgium and 16 Other Con-
tracting States, Appl. no. 52207/99; adc.dec., judgment of 12 December 2001, 2001, 
para. 71.
33  Heijer, Maarteen den and Lawson, Rick, “Transnational Human Rights and the 
Concept of ‘Jurisdiction’,” ESF Exploratory Workshop on Transnational Human 
Rights Obligation in the Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Tilburg: 
2008), discussion paper - unpublished; Scheinin, Martin, “Comments on ‘Jurisdic-
tion,” ESF Exploratory Workshop on Transnational Human Rights Obligations in the 
Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Tilburg, the Netherlands: 2008), dis-
cussion paper - unpublished.
34  Lawson, Rick A., “The Concept of Jurisdiction in the European Convention on 
Human Rights,” Globalisation and Jurisdiction, eds. Piet jan Slot and Mielle Bulter-
man (Leiden: Kluwer Law International, 2004), p. 209. See also: European Court of 
Human Rights, Markovic and Others V. Italy, Application No. 1398/03, judgment on 
14 December 2006, 2006.
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countries in this case under Article 1,35 and therefore, the application 
was dismissed.  Second, unlike earlier cases such as Loizidou vs. Turkey 
and Cyprus v. Turkey, where both the applicant state and respondent 
state were parties to the Convention, the Bankovic case involved two 
European counterparties before the Court, only one of whom was a 
signatory to the Convention. The case challenged the territorial concept 
upon which the ECHR was based, under Art. 1(2) of the ECHR, and 
questioned the scope of the Convention’s application to a third party. 
Can the doctrine of effective control over territory be applied in 
the context of ESC rights? The answer is yes.  Although there is no 
clear reference for the ICESCR’s scope of application, the fact cannot 
be denied that this instrument guarantees rights which are essentially 
territorial. Based on several pieces of evidence, it can be confirmed 
that the ICESCR applies both to territories over which a state has 
sovereignty, and those over which that state exercises territorial 
jurisdiction. Article 14 of the ICESCR gives transitional directions 
in the case of any state which ‘at the time of becoming a party, has 
not been able to secure in its metropolitan territory or other territories 
under its jurisdiction compulsory primary education, free of charge.’36 
Further confirmation can be found in the Maastricht Guidelines, which 
state that ‘under circumstances of alien domination, deprivation of 
economic, social, and cultural rights may be imputable to the conduct 
of the State exercising effective control over the territory in question.’37 
However, the application is limited to the contexts of  ‘colonialism, 
other forms of alien domination and military occupation.’38 Moreover, 
the ICESCR, observing Israel’s periodic reports, clearly adopts effective 
control in reconfirming its view that : ‘the state party’s obligation 
35  European Court of Human Rights Saddam Hussein V. Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukra-
nine, and the United Kingdom, Fourth Section Decision as to the Admissibility of 
Application no. 23276/04 on 14 March 2006, 2006.
36  International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004, Reports of Judgment, Advisory Opinion 
and Order of 9 July 2004, para. 112.





under the ICESCR apply to all territories and populations under its 
effective control.’39 This concluding observation was reiterated by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), when giving an advisory opinion on 
the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory. In this case, which involved the question of 
whether international human rights law, particularly the ICCPR, 
ICESCR, and the CRC, applied extraterritorially in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip, the ICJ concluded that ‘the protection offered by human 
rights conventions does not cease in the case of armed conflict’ and that 
‘the territories occupied by Israel have for over 37 years been subjected 
to its territorial jurisdiction as the occupying power.’40 Consequently, 
Israel was responsible under the ICCPR, ICESCR, and CRC regarding 
the human rights consequences of the Wall’s construction. Although 
the Court specifies certain rights that impacted the occupation, it is not 
clear exactly what type of obligations the occupying state held. The 
Court only states that Israel is ‘under an obligation not to raise any 
obstacle to the exercise of such rights in those fields where competence 
has been transferred to Palestinian authorities.’41 The assumption here 
is that the Court merely imposes the negative obligation namely the 
obligation to respect and protect human rights. 42  
Likewise, in the case of the Armed Activities on the Territory of 
the Congo, although the Court was not specifically dealing with the 
ICESCR, the applicability of effective control in human rights regime 
was reconfirmed:
178. The Court thus concludes that Uganda was the occupying Power in 
Ituri at the relevant time. As such it was under an obligation, according to 
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, to take all the measures in its 
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety in 
39  Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Resports Submitted by States Par-
ties under Article 40 of the Covenant; Concluding Observation of the Human Rights 
Committee, Israel, Seventy-eight sess., CCPR/CO/78/ISR, 21 August 2003, paras. 15 
& 31.
40  International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004, Reports of Judgment, Advisory Opinion 
and Order of 9 July 2004, para. 112.
41  Ibid.
42  Narula, Smita, “The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable under In-
ternational Law,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 44  (2005 - 2007), p. 734.
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the occupied area, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws 
in force in the DRC. This obligation comprised the duty to secure respect 
for the applicable rules of international human rights law and interna-
tional humanitarian law, to protect the inhabitants of the occupied ter-
ritory against acts of violence, and not to tolerate such violence by any 
third party.43
This case highlights two points. First, it is reconfirmed that the 
meaning of ‘territory’ has been extended to include the occupying 
territory. Consequently, the occupying power should also be responsible 
for any occurrence and subject within its ‘extra’ territory. Second, 
the ICJ clearly establishes that states have multiple obligations, both 
positive and negative, toward non-nationals outside their territory. 44 
With regard to business actors, paragraph 178 can be interpreted further 
as imposing obligations to states to regulate business actors operating in 
such outside territory and to adjudicate any cases involving violations 
by business actors. 
Though international human rights jurisprudence tells us that a state 
can exercise ‘effective control’ over territory in the case of occupation 
or armed conflict, its utility is very limited in the context of corporate 
responsibility and ESC rights, since the majority of extraterritorial 
regulations do not involve these limited scenarios, but rather concern 
economic issues. For the effective control doctrine to be more useful 
in the case of ESC rights protection, then, it would need to include 
situations in which states exercise effective economic control over 
policies or markets outside their territory.45 Here, applying an economic 
control standard to define the jurisdictional scope of human rights 
regulations could fill the gap resulting from extraterritorial economic 
43   United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the United Nation 
High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Sectoral Consultation Entitled ‘Human 
Rights and the Extractive Industry’, pt. E/CN.4/2006/92, U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/2006/92, 
19 December 2005.
44  Clapham, Andrew, “Rights and Responsibility : A Legal Perspective,” From Rights 
to Responsibilities: Rethinking Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes, eds. O. Jut-
ersonke and K. Krause, vol. PSIS Special Study 7 (Geneva: Programme for Strategic 
and International Security Studies, 2006), p. 66.
45  Narula, Smita, “The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable under 




impacts.46 Moreover, using effective economic control as a basis for 
state’s obligation to regulate and adjudicate would partly resolve the 
conflict of jurisdiction. 
2. Jurisdiction based on ‘effective control’ or ‘foreseeable 
consequence” over persons
There are two references already made to state responsibility which 
need to be mentioned again in this context: the ICJ case of Nicaragua 
v. United States and the ICTY case of Tadic . Although the latter case 
provides ‘looser standards’ by relying on overall control rather than 
effective control, both cases demand direct participation by the relevant 
party in order to invoke responsibility. Can either be applied to help 
determine the connection between a corporation and home country? 
Despite the difference between these two cases – one determining state 
responsibility and the other individual responsibility –neither one can be 
easily applied to this particular scenario, since in most cases corporations 
enjoy the autonomy to arrange management and operation. Even if home 
states intervene to regulate corporate behaviour, their involvement is 
limited. Although one can argue for corporations’ occasional control by 
government where that government is the main shareholder, and other 
situations in which states are controlled by corporate interests; these 
serve as exceptions to the rule. 
The state’s control over a person has also been applied to various 
degrees by the European Court on Human Rights and Human Rights 
Committee. In the case of Soering,47 the European Court on Human 
Rights held that the extradition of a German national by the United 
46  Narula, Smita, “The Jurisdictional Scope of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” ESF Exploratory Workshop on Transnational 
Human Rights Obligations in the Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Til-
burg, Netherland: 2008); Narula, Smita, “The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors 
Accountable under International Law,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 44 
(2005 - 2007), p. 734.
47  The case is about a German national detained in the UK, who could not be extra-
dited to Virginia in the United States in order to stand trial for murder, and possibly 
be sentenced to death. The question remains as to whether the extradition of a fugitive 
to another State where he would be subjected or likely be subjected to torture, inhu-
man and degrading treatment, or punishment, would engage the responsibility of a 
Contracting State under Article 3 ECHR. Judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A, Vol. 161. 
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Kingdom’s government to Virginia constituted a violation of Article 3 
of the European Convention on Human Right. This case carries two 
important implications. First, the decision of this case is based on physical 
control over a legal person,48 meaning that the UK is responsible for a 
German national due to his physical presence in the United Kingdom. 
Second, the case is based on the foreseeable consequence argument, 
according to which the UK’s action to extradite will endanger the 
applicant. It implies that the UK is also responsible for any foreseeable 
consequences which occur within another jurisdiction.49  In the case of 
Ng v. Canada, the HRC held that Canada’s extradition of the defendant 
to the US to stand trial in California, where he was likely to face the 
death penalty, constitutes a breach of Article 7 of the ICCPR. From 
these two cases, it can be assumed that the state in which an individual 
is physically present is obliged not only to respect the rights of that 
individual, but also provide protection by not extraditing the person 
to a known situation of endangerment. Here, ‘effective’ control  or 
‘foreseeable” consequence over a person refers to the physical presence 
of an entity in a particular country. 
Control over a person as a basis of extraterritorial obligation has 
also prevailed in the case of issuing visas. The cases of Vida Martin v. 
Uruguay, Linctenztein v. Uruguay, and Nunex v. Uruguay, all presented 
before the Human Rights Committee, ended in the opinion that the 
Uruguayan government’s refusal to renew the passports of its citizens 
living abroad clearly is a violation of human rights.50 Therefore, Uruguay 
is responsible for human rights protections over its nationals who live 
abroad. It is clear, then, that states issuing visas or passports are still 
responsible for human rights protections over nationals or aliens living 
abroad. 
There has also been a recognition of states’ responsibility to control 
criminals and terrorists located in their territory, who may cause harm 
48   Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations, State Responsibility, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1083, p. 165. 
49  Judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A, Vol. 161, para. 91. 
50  Heijer, Maarteen den and Lawson, Rick, “Transnational Human Rights and the 
Concept of ‘Jurisdiction’,” ESF Exploratory Workshop on Transnational Human 
Rights Obligation in the Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Tilburg: 
2008), at 21 & 22.
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to other states. This was confirmed in Lawless v. Ireland and McCann v. 
The United Kingdom. In McCann, the Court held that governments are 
‘required to have regard to their duty to protect the lives of the people 
in Gibraltar including their own military personnel.’51
States may also operate abroad on the basis of ad hoc agreements 
or informal arrangements of cooperation between two states. Here, the 
cases of Xhavara v. Italy and Öcalan v. Turkey serve as two examples. 
In the Xhavara case, involving Albanian citizens who had been trying 
to enter Italy illegally when their boat sank following a collision with 
an Italian warship, the ECrtHR held that since Italy was a party to the 
bilateral agreement with Albania authorising the Italian Navy to board 
and search Albanian boats in order to encourage illegal immigrants, 
this triggered Italy’s responsibility in the incident.52  In the Öcalan case, 
the Court concluded that the arrest of the PKK leader by members of 
Turkish security forces at the Nairobi airport effectively brought Mr 
Öcalan within Turkish authority, due to the informal arrangements that 
already existed between Turkey and Kenya.53  
These illustrations signify that the degree involved in ‘control 
over a person’ or ‘foreseeable’ consequence is less than that for cases 
requiring ‘effective’ control over individuals. The former is applied 
differently, based on the physical and legal links of control which 
may not be permanent. Here, the pivotal issue is the degree of control 
and how it should be implemented. This implies a question about the 
exact nature of the relationship between control and jurisdiction. What 
kind of control triggers jurisdiction and state responsibility? Is it all 
types? Moreover, control over what? No answer remains. Despite these 
remaining ambiguities, the cases described provide some basis for 
invoking the extraterritorial responsibility of home states. 
3. Jurisdiction based on Decisive Influence Standards 
In additional to effective control, extraterritorial human rights 
obligations can also be based on looser criteria – namely, the decisive 
51  McCann and Other Judgements, 27 Sept. 1995, Series, A. No. 324.
52  European Court of Human Rights, Xhavara and Others V. Italy and Albania, Ap-
plication No. 39473/98, 2001, Decision.
53  European Court of Human Rights, Öcalan V. Turkey, Application no. 46221/99, 
2005, Judgment, paras. 16, 90 - 99.
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influence standard.  One interesting related case is Ilascu and others v. 
Moldova and Russia, before the European Court of Human Rights. In 
this case, the Court had to determine whether detainees in the breakaway 
region of Trandniestria, Moldova lay within the jurisdiction of Russia, 
by virtue of Russia’s support for rebel forces there, yet, conversely, had 
to determine whether the detainees could fall within the jurisdiction 
of Molvoda. Here, the Court stated that the fact of Moldova’s loss of 
effective control over the separatist regime did not discharge the country 
from its positive obligations to take all diplomatic, economic, judicial 
or other measures in its power to secure release of the applicants.54  In 
other words, the reduction of the actual power to act did not discharge 
its positive obligations. However, since the Moldavian Republic of 
Transdniestria (MRT) forces were under the ‘effective control, or at 
the very least decisive influence’ of Russia, as the forces survived ‘by 
virtue of the military, economic, financial, and political support’ given 
by that country,55 the ECrtHR found that Russia was responsible for 
harm caused by authorities to the applicants in the breakaway region 
of the MRT.56 The Court also attributed responsibility to Russia for not 
having taken foreseeable action to prevent the abuses in question.57 
Applying the Ilascu reasoning of decisive influence, one can argue 
that home states are responsible for MNC operating abroad, provided 
that it gives them economic, financial, or political support.58 Narula 
54  Heijer, Maarteen den and Lawson, Rick, “Transnational Human Rights and the 
Concept of ‘Jurisdiction’,” ESF Exploratory Workshop on Transnational Human 
Rights Obligation in the Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Tilburg: 
2008).
55  European Court of Human Rights, Ilascu V. Russia & Moldova, Appl. 48787/99, 
2004, para. 392.
56  The Russia refused of exercising control over MRT as it had only a peacekeeping 
mission (military deployment) to preserve peace and stability in the region and its 
presence is approved by Moldova. Ibid., paras. 356, 357, 393 & 441.
57  Ibid; Narula, Smita, “The Jurisdictional Scope of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” ESF Exploratory Workshop on Transnational 
Human Rights Obligations in the Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Til-
burg, Netherland: 2008), p. 23.
58  Narula, Smita, “The Jurisdictional Scope of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” ESF Exploratory Workshop on Transnational 
Human Rights Obligations in the Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Til-
burg, Netherland: 2008), p. 24.
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lists several other possible influences by the home state, including the 
negotiation, drafting, ratification and enforcement of various bilateral 
or multilateral investment treaties on the legal rights of MNC, as well 
as government guarantee or insurance for various risky projects.59 The 
government’s supportive role is also apparent when acting as a loan 
guarantor for MNC before international financial institutions, providing 
diplomatic immunity, and representing them at international dispute 
settlements.  It is clear that in many cases, home state support is vital to 
an MNC’s survival in the host country. 
4. Jurisdiction based on the capacity to influence
Another ‘loose’ criterion for establishing state’s responsibility is 
provided in the 2007 Genocide case, under the category of due diligence 
standards: 
The first, which varies greatly from one State to another, is clearly the 
capacity to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or 
already committing, genocide. This capacity itself depends, among other 
things, on the geographical distance of the State concerned from the scene 
of the events, and on the strength of the political links, as well as links of 
all other kinds, between the authorities of that State and the main actors in 
the events. The State’s capacity to influence must also be assessed by legal 
criteria, since it is clear that every State may only act within the limits per-
mitted by international law; seen thus, a State’s capacity to influence may 
vary depending on its particular legal position vis-à-vis the situations and 
persons facing the danger, or the reality, of genocide. On the other hand, 
it is irrelevant whether the State whose responsibility is in issue claims, or 
even proves, that even if it had employed all means reasonably at its dis-
posal, they would not have sufficed to prevent the commission of genocide. 
As well as being generally difficult to prove, this is irrelevant to the breach 
of the obligation of conduct in question, the more so since the possibility 
remains that the combined efforts of several States, each complying with 
its obligation to prevent, might have achieved the result - averting the com-
mission of genocide - which the efforts of only one State were insufficient 
to produce.60
To apply this case to the current issue under discussion, the home state 
should have the capacity to effectively influence actions of MNC that are 
59  Ibid., pp. 23 & 24.
60  International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina V. Serbia and Monte-
negro), Judgment, 26 February 2007, para. 430.
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likely to commit human rights violations. The determination of capacity 
to influence is conducted deductively depending on the geographical 
proximity of the state concerned, relevant events, and the strength of 
political and other bonds. Here, the principle of reasonableness, which 
is commonly applied in the US in the context of antitrust law, in section 
403 (2) of the Restatement (third) of the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States, applies when determining the strongest connection. 
61 If the event has taken place far from the home state’s territory, the 
exercise of jurisdiction will be considered unreasonable.62 This does 
not mean that human rights violations occurring in other countries will 
not trigger home state responsibility, but rather, that this determination 
is based on the location of the MNC’s action or omission. One way of 
filling the legal gap resulting from geographical distance is through a 
parent company, which resides in the home country and has subsidiaries 
in other countries. Through territorial jurisdiction exercised over the 
parent company, the home state may exercise de facto ‘control’ or 
‘influence’ over foreign subsidiaries whose conduct in some respect 
depends on the parent company’s corporate decisions. Consequently, 
the home country is capable of extending the material reach of their 
influence over foreign activities of MNCs.63 In this case, the parameters 
for determining home state responsibility become intertwined with 
those determining the responsibility of home corporations,64 due to 
the economic-legal medium of corporate management.  Then, in order 
to avoid state responsibility, home states should prevent violations 
from occurring or, if such violation occurs, it should hold the MNC 
accountable.
61  Restatement of the Third Law: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States Re-
statement of the Law, ed. The American Law Institute, vol. 1 (St Paul, American Law 
Institute Publishers, 1986), section 403 (2).
62  Ryngaert, Cedric, “Discussion Paper “ ESF Explanatory Workshop on Transnation-
al Human Rights Obligations in the Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(Tilburg: 2008).
63  Francioni, Francesco, “Exporting Environment Hazard through Multinational En-
terprise: Can a State of Origin Be Held Responsible?,” International Responsibil-
ity for Environmental Harm, eds. Francesco Francioni and Tullio Scovazzi (London: 
Graham & Trotman, 1991), p. 284.
64  Ryngaert, Cedric, “Discussion Paper “ ESF Explanatory Workshop on Transnation-




Apart from geographical proximity, the determination of the 
capacity to influence should also be based on legal criteria, determined 
by international law. Here, all connections provided in the doctrine 
of jurisdiction as permissible,65  as well as obligatory connections 
mentioned earlier, can be applied.  The principles of nationality abroad, 
substantial or intended substantial effect, and universal jurisdiction can 
be used to assess states’ capacity to influence and thus, its international 
responsibility. In this case, states may be held responsible for violations 
by MNC, provided that these MNCs carry the home state’s nationality, 
the corporation’s activity abroad has a substantial effect on home 
states, or the violation constitutes an international crime with universal 
jurisdiction. Another scenario, as mentioned earlier, is the application 
of obligatory connection.  Through effective control of MNC, or 
economically and politically supporting them through loan guarantees, 
investments and other channels, home states may have the capacity to 
influence MNC’s behaviour. Then, the failure of the former to set proper 
conditions by which that corporation may receive support, or its failure 
to redress violations by the entity, can trigger state’s responsibility of 
due diligence. Here, individuals whose ESC rights are violated by MNC 
abroad also fall under home state jurisdiction. 
This capacity of home states to influence may serve as a means of 
establishing jurisdiction leading to state responsibility, by providing 
flexible standards for interpreting the meaning of ‘jurisdiction’ over 
non-state actors and imposing obligations to home countries; in 
contrast, the other criteria discussed above cannot. The difficulty arises 
in establishing the necessary connection and applying the principle of 
reasonableness, which requires close relationships between the states, 
individuals or activities to be regulated.66 If that link between the state 
and the entity/activity is strong, and if other states’ sovereign interests 
are not intruded upon, bringing an individual or entity under a certain 
state responsibility is reasonable.67 This also implies that despite the 
65  Ibid.
66  Restatement of the Third Law: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States Restatement 
of the Law, ed. The American Law Institute, vol. 1 (St Paul, American Law Institute Publishers, 
1986), section 403 (2).
67  Ryngaert, Cedric, “Discussion Paper “ ESF Explanatory Workshop on Transnation-
al Human Rights Obligations in the Field of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(Tilburg: 2008).
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strong linkage between individuals and their home state, the latter 
should not be obliged to protect individual human rights if this would 
violate the principle of non-intervention. Here, sovereignty limits the 
practice of jurisdiction. 
This construction does not mean that a state is not entitled to 
regulate and protect individuals in other countries; only that it is not 
obliged to do so.68 Here, the concept of jurisdiction is perceived as a 
continuum.69 On one side, states are obliged under human rights treaties 
to protect individuals under their jurisdiction, if a link exists between 
the individual and that state.  At the other extreme, states cannot protect 
individuals not falling under its jurisdiction, if the aforementioned 
connection is weak, or other states have an overriding interest.70
B. THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE 
AND COOPERATION
In the context of economy, social, and cultural rights, Articles 2 (1), 
11, 15, 22, and 23 of the ICESCR concerning international assistance and 
cooperation represent examples of how the extraterritorial obligation to 
protect can be created. But, what is meant by international assistance or 
cooperation? Who should give assistance? The ICESCR in its General 
Comments no. 14, 15, 17, and 18, clearly states that ‘states parties and 
other actors are in a position to assist’, should provide ‘international 
assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical which 
enable developing countries to fulfil their core obligations.’ Here, 
the ICESCR is clearly distinguishing obligations to assist that rest on 
developed countries or any entities having the capacity to assist others; 
as a consequence, developing countries that are unable to fulfil their 
obligations under the Covenant should seek assistance, and use it to 




71  See further discussion on obligation of assistance recipient in meeting the condi-
tions imposed to receive such assistance in Sepúlveda, Magdalena, “Obligations of 
‘Internaitonal Assistance and Cooperation’ in an Optional Protocl to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” Netherland Quarterly of Hu-
man Rights 24.2 (2006), p. 291.
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The CESCR does not specifically elaborate which fields can receive 
assistance, and the type of assistance that can be given. This depends 
on the particular needs of the recipient, and the state of cooperation 
between that recipient and assistant provider. However, several General 
Comments highlight the importance of financial, technical, relief and 
emergency assistance fulfilling ESC rights such as health,72 water,73 and 
food,74 as well as the prohibition of embargo or similar measures that 
could negatively affect enjoyment of ESC rights.75 Moreover, the use of 
legal and political assistance to influence third parties to respect these 
rights is allowed, as long as this is in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations and applicable law.76 This implies that the meaning of 
international assistance or cooperation includes regulatory frameworks, 
or any legal assistance. Cooperation and assistance may be exercised on 
a collective as well as individual basis through international or regional 
organisations, as well as bilaterally. 
In short, the duty to cooperate is a general duty which incorporates 
other layers of obligation,  and in fact, serves as the basis for applying 
extraterritorial obligations. This cooperation may take a direct form, or 
indirectly by not objecting to extraterritorial measures by other states. 
With respect to extraterritorial regulation of corporate human rights 
responsibility, home state regulation and adjudication of corporate 
human rights responsibility should be viewed in terms of such 
72  Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14, the 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Twenty-second session, 2000 
sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, 2000.
73  Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment 15, the 
Right to Water, Twenty-ninth Session, 2003 sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, 2002, 
para. 34.
74  Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, Right 
to Adequate Food, Twentieth session, 1999 sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5, 1999, 
para. 36.
75  Ibid., para. 37; Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Gener-
al Comment 15, the Right to Water, Twenty-ninth Session, 2003 sess., U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/2002/11, 2002, para. 32.
76  Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14, the 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Twenty-second session, 2000 
sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, 2000, para. 39; Committee on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights, General Comment 15, the Right to Water, Twenty-ninth Session, 
2003 sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, 2002, para. 39.
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cooperation. In this respect, home state regulation can be considered a 
part of human rights obligation.
V. SOME LIMITATIONS
Although the extraterritorial regulation was justified, some 
limitations should be applied. 
A. EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATION VERSUS 
PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE
As mentioned, the principle of non-intervention delimits the 
application of extraterritorial obligations.  In international law, this 
important principle is simply defined as the prohibition against the use 
of political, economic, and other coercive means, by a state or group 
of states, for any reason, to either directly or indirectly force another 
state to behave in a certain way, where that state enjoys autonomy 
and freedom.77 This principle is embodied in various international 
instruments and jurisprudence, as well as established and substantial 
state practice, indicating the existence of opinio juris of states. 78 It is 
also important to note that non-intervention emphasizes the competition 
between the various interests of states. 
The development of human rights under international law since 1945 
has challenged this non-intervention doctrine.  A closer examination 
of the relationship between the two priorities reveals two different 
purposes. The field of human rights developed to protect the interest 
77  Franz Xaver Perrez, Cooperative Sovereignty: From Independence to Interdepen-
dence in the Structure of International Environmental Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000), p. 150; Jr Charles W. Kegley, Gregory A. Raymond and Marga-
ret G. Hermann, “The Rise and Fall of the Nonintervention Norm: Some Correlates 
and Potential Consequences,” Fletcher Forum World Affair 22 (1998).
78  Article 8 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 
Article 15 of the 1948 Charter of the Organization of American States, Article 8 of 
the 1945 Charter of the League of Arab States, and Article 3 of the 1963 Charter of 
the Organization of African Unity, Article 32 of the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States, General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX) 1965 on the Declaration on 
the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection 
of their Independence and Sovereignty, the General Assembly Resolution 2131 para 
1, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation.
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of individuals and groups, while non-intervention developed to protect 
states from involvement by other states in their affairs. However, what 
if the state interest fails to coincide with the individual interest; where 
does one concept end and the other begin? States, with an interest in 
attracting investors, may provide privileges and protection to business 
actors at the expense of individuals, or refuse to provide extraterritorial 
protection when the absence of ratification frees the home country from 
extraterritorial obligation. As a result, there is the risk of individual 
interests being overridden by state interests. If such a situation arises, 
can human rights clauses be used as justification to override the principle 
of non-intervention? 
There are two ways of approaching this issue: by stressing the 
dichotomy between internal and international jurisdiction; and through 
deeper understanding of the notion of non-intervention. As state 
practices change, so do these two elements. 
The example can be found in the context of humanitarian 
intervention. The right to intervene for humanitarian purposes has been 
reformulated in the context of ‘responsibility to protect’, where the 
intervention is no longer perceived as a right but rather an obligation 
of states, when other states are unwilling and unable to protect their 
own citizens from avoidable catastrophes - including the violation of 
human rights. In this case, the protection of the victim may be seen as 
an overriding justification that trumps the principle of non-intervention. 
This does not mean that any case involving violations or threats to 
human rights automatically leads to the ‘obligation to intervene’; only 
that such an obligation, based on the scale of need, be invoked as a last 
resort when the concerned state fails to protect the victim.79  It should be 
construed in the broad and positive sense interpreted by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.80 
While this interpretation of intervention has been used in a military 
context for humanitarian intervention, it is questioned whether state 
practice supports this argument in a non-military, extraterritorial, 
regulatory framework. Some proposals have been made to include 
79  The Responsibility to Protect, (The International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty, December 2001), p. vii.
80  Ibid.
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human rights protection as one criterion to be used in balancing state 
interest. The classical example is crimes against humanity or other 
international crimes in which there is universal jurisdiction, where all 
states have interest and are obliged to prevent such crimes and prosecute 
the perpetrator.  Another such attempt has been made regarding sex 
tourism. The UK government, for example, proposes various factors 
to be used in balancing the state interest and the victim’s need, such as 
the seriousness of offence, degree of danger, vulnerability of victims, 
existence of international obligations, form of violence, and the the 
reputation of the UK before international community. The G8 has 
articulated a similar proposal regarding sex tourism, whereby in order to 
combat child exploitation effectively, extraterritorial jurisdiction by the 
home country over foreign costumers should be allowed. The reasoning 
behind such a policy is premised on the inability or unwillingness of the 
destination country to deal with sex tourism and the mobility of foreign 
customers.81 While such proposals are usually based on the nationality 
principle, the protection of victims has also been a consideration in 
cases of potential conflict of interests between states. No objections 
have been raised.  
Meanwhile, several draft regulations providing for the extraterritorial 
regulation of MNC abroad have been issued by several countries, such 
as the US Draft Corporate Code of Conduct Act 2000, Australian 
Draft Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000, and UK 2003 Corporate 
Responsibility Bill; however, since none of these passed, there is 
no way of testing their challenge to the non-intervention principle. 
Interestingly, one of the considerations for the failure of the Australian 
Code in 2000 was not due to the possible objection of the host country, 
but rather the fear that the home state’s extraterritorial regulation would 
be perceived by other countries – especially developing ones – as 
81  Because many destination countries lack the resources to investigate and prosecute 
all reports of child exploitation, including by foreigners who may well have left their 
country before the abuse is even reported, or do not have legislation concerning child 
exploitation, the extraterritorial reach of these laws prevents destination countries 
from becoming zones where those who sexually exploit children can act with impu-
nity. See: G8 Experience in the Implementation of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction for Sex 
Crimes against Children, (18 April 2007).
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‘arrogant, patronising, paternalistic and racist.’82 This highlights how 
sovereignty can be a sensitive question for both home and host states.  
To conclude, redefining the concept of sovereignty to include human 
rights protection has opened the door to an expansive understanding 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Theoretically, the principle of non-
intervention can be violated if the foreign state has an overriding interest 
pursued on the basis of human rights. Still, this practice is in embryonic 
form, and needs to be developed further. 
B. ARE HUMAN RIGHTS A DOMESTIC OR 
INTERNATIONAL ISSUE?
Are human rights as applied to corporate responsibility, a domestic 
matter? Many states have argued that social affairs, human rights, and 
the environment are domestic in nature. The US Restatement clearly 
defines industrial and labour relations, health and safety practices, or 
conduct related to the preservation or control of the local environment 
to conclusively fall under the discretion of each country; therefore, 
any extraterritorial regulation of such issues is not permissible.83 The 
basis for this conclusion is not only conceptual but practical; such 
issues are highly dependent on local circumstances, and thus, diversity 
should be maintained.84 However, the inclusions of human rights in 
the United Nations Charter that are binding upon all members, and 
the establishment of jus cogens as well as treaties, customs and other 
means of international obligation, demonstrate that the human rights 
are no longer exclusively domestic.  Moreover, the existence of an 
international human rights monitoring system to deal with breaches 
of international law serves as further evidence that human rights no 
longer fall only under domestic jurisdiction. Today, states cannot claim 
domestic jurisdiction to justify the violation of human rights; how states 
82  Report on the Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000, (Parliamentary Joint Statutory 
Committee on Corporations adn Securities, the Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, June 2001), p. 45.
83  American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relation, 1987, 
213.
84  Jennifer A. Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 136 - 137; Thierry Berthet, Philippe Cuntigh 
and Christophe Guitton, “Employment Policy and Territories,” Training & Employ-
ment 46 Jan-Mar (2000).
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treat their own citizens is no longer perceived as their own business. 
This is not to say that the international arena is always the best context 
for addressing these matters, but simply to point to how much the scope 
of domestic jurisdiction has diminished as international law continues 
to develop in this area.85 If the line drawn for human rights represents 
that marking the permissible intervention in states,86 this line is not 
fixed, but varies both temporally and geographically depending on 
other developments in international relations. 
This shift in thought from a domestic to an international paradigm 
has implications for the current discussion. While many business issues 
are still domestic concerns, many others have gained international 
attention.  This is due to the interdependent and transnational nature of 
MNC, and the complicating factor of the relationship between home 
and host country, as well as a general increase in the attention focused 
worldwide on human rights issue.  This, in turn, has complicated the 
field of corporate human rights responsibility as it applies to both 
domestic and international arenas. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION
In the context of regulatory framework, the regulation of MNC 
is actually far less extraterritorial in nature than the term suggests. 
Principally, such regulation affects only the corporation which is 
incorporated or has central management within the territory of a state, 
but operates abroad through its corporate branches. In this case, the 
closeness of contact is mostly a function of two factors: the nationality 
principle, and managerial control. Extraterritorial regulation by one 
state with respect to the activity of a corporate parent, subsidiary or 
other member of a multinational, is enforced directly toward members 
of the group established in the territory of the regulating state, which 
may be considered to have the ‘nationality’ of that state.87 This signifies 
85  Dominic McGoldrick, “The Principle of Non-Intervention: Human Rights,” The 
United Nations and the Principles of International Law: Essays in Memory of Micael 
Akehurst, eds. Vaughan Lowe and Colin Warbrick (Routledge, 1994), p. 86.
86  Ibid., pp. 86 & 87.
87  Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonableness: 
Essays in Private International Law (Oxford: Clareon Press, 1996), p. 106.
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that the regulation is a national one, and therefore meets the minimum 
contact requirement. 
However, the national regulation of a multinational enterprise may be 
multinational in effect; extraterritorially, therefore, state are required to 
consider the potential or actual effect of their exercise of jurisdiction on 
other states.88 For example, if home state legislation imposed a specific 
labour or environmental standard which differed from the environmental 
standard imposed in the host state (and for which there is no existing 
international standard), a conflict may exist between the home state 
and host state law. Nevertheless, not all apparent conflicts are really 
conflicts. The general rule is that a conflict exists where compliance 
with the law of one forum results in a violation of the law of another. In 
other words, there is a conflict if it is impossible to comply with both 
laws at the same time. Thus, the general rule is to try to balance state 
interests.  Here, it is proposed that human rights argument be brought 
into play. The question is no longer the one of which state interest 
deserves protection, but rather, whether a need exists for human rights 
protection. Therefore, initiatives designed to give effect to established 
principles of human rights should not automatically be regarded as 
interference, even where an initiative has gone beyond that which is 
strictly necessary to give effect to human rights. As pointed out, this 
extraterritorial regulation would not usually be considered ‘unjustified’ 
where a significant degree of international consensus exists on an issue. 
Moreover, the divisions between domestic and international affairs, 
competing of state and individual interests against the background of 
emerging human rights protection, and the variety of legal techniques for 
exerting pressure, signify changes in the principle of non-intervention, 
whose direction will be determined by state practice. The boundary 
between national and international affairs has not been bridged or 
erased, but circumvented. Such a distinction may thus no longer be 
necessary or helpful, since it becomes a potential source of confusion. 
To conclude, it is argued here that in the context of jurisdiction, 
extraterritorial regulation is not about the right of a State to govern its 
own interest within its jurisdiction and/or other jurisdiction but it is also 
about obligation to State to do so in the context of human rights. 
88  Ibid.
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